The post-Cancun backlash, and seven strategies to keep the WTO off the tracks
24/11/2003
- Opinión
GATT and WTO Ministerial meetings have the tradition of collapsing
when developing countries stand up for their legitimate rights and
interests. This has been the situation since the Uruguay Round,
during which two ministerials collapsed -- in Montreal (1988) and
Brussels (1990). The sticking point was agriculture and the refusal
of developing countries to accept the double standards of
protectionism practiced by the North, whilst at the same time
imposing market opening on the South.
Similarly, the collapse of the Seattle Ministerial in 1999 was in
large part due to the refusal of developing countries to be ignored
in the process and to be forced to accept a package agreed by the
major powers amongst themselves.
Cancun - four years on - is little different. The US, EU and their
allies, while brandishing rhetoric and appearing to be benevolent,
were merely trying, yet again, to extract the highest price from the
developing world without giving anything in return. Developing
countries did not back down in their fight for more balance in the
package. The G-20 coalition continued to fight for less distortions
in agriculture trade, and the G-70 (or Alliance as they are now
called), composed of the African Union, ACP (Africa, Caribbean and
Pacific) and LDCs (least developed countries), refused to accept new
negotiations in the 'Singapore issues'. The US was unwilling to
budge in agriculture, nor to give anything on the cotton issue where
four West African countries – Benin, Burkino Faso, Mali and Chad --
had made a powerful call for the elimination of cotton subsidies.
The cotton lobby in the US is too powerful, and the Bush
administration, heading into elections in 2004, was not interested
in antagonizing them.
Post-Cancun, man in Geneva speculate that the US, angered by
developing countries' refusal to back down, and their inability to
force their agenda onto the developing world, engineered for the
meeting to end when it did.
However, if the not-so-distant Seattle, post-Seattle and the 2001
Doha Ministerial negotiations are indicative, talks will restart,
and in response to the Cancun show of strength from the South, the
counter-offensive from US and EU will be all the more aggressive.
THE US AND EU HIT BACK: THE BLAME GAME
Already, the counter-offensive is in full swing. The blame game,
which EU trade commissioner Pascal Lamy promised in Cancun he would
not play, is underway. Both the US and EU are spinning the story
that the Cancun collapse was the fault of developing countries,
blaming them for being rhetorical rather than serious in the
negotiations. Should they want any movement now, the EU and US
insist, the developing countries will have to come up with a better
offer.
US trade representative Robert Zoellick, right after the collapse of
Cancun, also said that "The harsh rhetoric of the `won't do'
overwhelmed the concerted efforts of the `can do'." More recently,
the US Commerce under-secretary, Grant Aldonas said that there was
"not a lot of incentive" for the US and the EU to "lower politically
sensitive trade barriers if poor countries refused to lower theirs."
Commissioner Lamy has been quoted as saying that the EC and the US
"will be waiting for a number of positive signals coming from other
parts of the trade community," such as the G-20 and the G- 70.
Developing country ministers and ambassadors have also come under
fire. The US, for instance, called a meeting of Washington- based
developing country negotiators to complain about the unreasonable
positions of their Geneva counterparts. This led to the Nigerian
Washington based ambassador writing to his president Obasanjo,
questioning the position that the Nigerian Geneva-based ambassador
was taking. One LDC African delegate, whose minister was prominent
in Cancun, said that his minister is now being called by "everyone,
including the US", and made to answer the question of how the
Cancun talks can be put back on track. The World Bank and IMF have
also written to many developing country heads of state instructing
them to restart talks, obviously with the implication that funds
could be given or withdrawn.
On November 13 and 14 an exclusive, informal ministerial meeting
was held in Cairo between a small group of African ministers. The
meeting was convened by the WTO's director general Supachai
Panitchpakdi, and his chef de cabinet, Stuart Harbinson. Ministers
from Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Chad, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali,
Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and the host, Egypt, were
present. The topic under discussion was how African ministers can
take steps to move the talks forward. It is clear that the DG
Supachai is attempting to do all in his power to call ministers to
be more flexible. A key area of discussion in the Cairo meeting was
the Singapore issues.
In addition, the US has exerted considerable pressure on the G-20
to break the coalition. Six countries have pulled out of the
grouping so far – El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, Ecuador, Columbia
and Costa Rica -- as a result of threats that their FTAs and other
trading arrangements with the US would be jeopardised.
Brazil, the leader of the G-20, both in Cancun and post-Cancun has
been demonized by the US as trying to create a North-South split in
the WTO membership.
CURRENT US/EU ATTEMPTS TO WRESTLE GROUND FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
In Geneva, the US and EU have found, in the Uruguay ambassador
Perez del Castillo, an appropriate spokesperson for their interests.
Del Castillo is the current chair of the general council and has set
himself the task of attempting to complete the work that ministers
did not finish in Cancun by the 15 December senior official meeting
in Geneva. He has chosen four of the most contentious issues to
begin consultations as a way to unlock the negotiations:
agriculture, cotton, Singapore issues and non-agriculture market
access (NAMA).
The main negotiations are held in non-transparent consultations of
only about 30 members (or 'green room' meetings). In agriculture
and NAMA, del Castillo has been pushing hard for the developing
countries to accept the Cancun-produced Derbez text (named after
the Mexican minister presiding at Cancun).
In agriculture, the Derbez text is very similar to the joint US/EU
paper that was submitted to the WTO membership in August, which
took into account only the US and EU agricultural interests. It
calls for drastic market access openings in such a way that it
would hit the developing countries hard, but not the developed
countries, and does not deal effectively with subsidies that
contribute directly or indirectly to export dumping.
Similarly, in the non-agriculture market access negotiations, the
Derbez text does not reflect developing country concerns. It does
not include commitments made in the Doha Declaration (such as the
concept of less than full reciprocity) but enhances developed
countries' interests, for instance by calling for a non-linear
formula, as well as a sectoral liberalization approach. (See
following article for full discussions of this point.) The majority
of developing countries have been vehemently opposed to both these
liberalization strategies since their industries are more
vulnerable, and they will be celled to liberalize more than the
developed countries. Neither does the text call on the developed
world to reduce their protection in any meaningful way, since it
glosses over the issue of non-tariff barriers - the most common way
the developed world protects their industrial products. UNCTAD has
already predicted that if the current liberalization agenda is
adopted there will be serious destruction to many countries' already
fragile industrial base, leading to deindustrialization.
There is no doubt that, if these texts are accepted as the basis of
negotiations, developing countries will fight very hard to ensure
that they are improved. However, as one negotiator commented,
recognizing the political constraints of the South in any
negotiations with the major powers, "The US/EC framework is biased
against us from the beginning. We can try to improve them, but they
cannot be entirely improved upon."
African and other developing countries' negotiators, now blamed for
Cancun's collapse, are being told by the major powers that their
agreement to use this biased Derbez text as the basis of
negotiations is one way to demonstrate their willingness to be
constructive.
Similarly, despite over 90 countries insisting on not commencing
negotiations on the Singapore issues in Cancun, del Castillo is
ignoring their public statements. In Geneva, he is now proposing
that the clarification process continues for investment and
competition, with a view to eventual negotiations, and that
negotiations take place in transparency in government procurement
and trade facilitation.
CIVIL SOCIETY STRATEGIES: KEEPING THE TRAIN OFF THE TRACKS
From the outset, it should be noted that the WTO is beyond reform.
This is not an ideological argument, but an empirical observation.
If there is doubt, one need only ask if any changes have been made
since its formation which have benefited the developing world.
Developing country negotiators, trade unions, social movements and
NGOs have worked very hard since the WTO's inception to improve
upon its inequitable rules. However, the rules have not been
changed to their benefit in even minuscule ways. This is true in
all areas – agriculture, TRIPS and Public Health, implementation
issues, the Framework agreement on Special and Differential
Treatment, GATS. Even in institutional reform (democracy and
transparency issues) where developing countries made a concerted
effort post-Doha, nothing has changed. If anything, the anti-
democratic processes have merely become more sophisticated. In not
a single set of negotiations within this WTO multilateral system,
have developing countries come out as the beneficiaries. Instead,
the developing countries are forced into the corner of damage
limitation. We should have no illusions about the current
negotiations either.
Even though developing country coalitions are now able to pull some
weight and are set to become significant and permanent partners at
the negotiating table, they will remain politically less powerful
and their ability to chart the institution's agenda and direction
will be limited.
SEVEN STRATEGIES FOR KEEPING THE TRAIN OFF THE TRACK
What then should our strategies be? In the short term, the next WTO
ministerial in Hong Kong (end 2004 or early 2005) will be a crunch
point. Either the train remains derailed or, given the aggressive
US-EU counter-attack, arm-twisting, and bullying, it gets back on
track and charges ahead with a renewed force.
The following are some suggestions on how to keep the train off-
track:
1) Keep the EU Member States Split on the Singapore Issues,
Developing Countries Should Insist on Dropping them from the Doha
Mandate and WTO
European civil society groups did a signal service before Cancun by
lobbying the various member states to drop the 'new issues'. As a
result, EU member states are now split. Such splits should be
reinforced, so as to make the European Commission's position as
negotiator on behalf of the member states as difficult as possible.
Developing countries should insist on dropping the Singapore issues
from the Doha Development Agenda and from the WTO since there was
no explicit consensus to launch any of the negotiations at the
Fifth Ministerial, as instructed in the Doha Declaration. Legally,
it can be argued that the Doha mandate is now over. (See South
Centre Informal Background note, 'The Post- Cancun Legal Status of
Singapore Issues in the WTO', draft, 4 November 2003.) The working
groups on the new issues - Investment, Competition, Transparency in
Government Procurement, as well as the Special Session of the Good
Council dealing with Trade Facilitation- should cease to exist.
2) Insist on Halting Agriculture Negotiations Until there is an End
to Export Dumping
Civil society groups, particularly in the EU and US should insist
that their governments halt agriculture negotiations until such time
direct or indirect subsidies contributing to export dumping have
been eliminated. Whilst small farmers in the North also require
support, it is important that this support does not contribute to
dumping. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for instance, should
delineate between products for domestic production vs. export
production. Subsidies must not be allowed for those products aimed
at the export market.
3) Cotton Initiative
It is important that this initiative is continued, and on a separate
track from the more general agriculture negotiations. This issue was
a likely cause of the Cancun collapse. The two areas where the US
and the EC do not want to tread, and therefore where pressure should
be exerted, are: i) ensuring the elimination of subsidies in cotton
and ii) providing financial compensation for the injuries caused.
Both Brussels and Washington are fearful that compensating the West
Africans would set a precedent in the WTO for financial compensation
in other sectors.
4) Non-agriculture Market Access Negotiations (NAMA)
Support developing countries in their resistance to drastic
liberalization of the industrial sector. More studies on the impact
of liberalization and deindustrialization in the South should be
carried out before negotiations recommence.
5) Oppose Strengthening the Secretariat and Director General's
Powers, Insist on Democracy and Transparency
Whilst the European trade commission Lamy had said that the WTO is
"medieval", his real intention is to make it Stone Age so that the
process of decision-making is one where the positions of developed
countries will carry the day. Amongst other reforms, the EC is
proposing looking into increasing funding for the Secretariat and
strengthening the powers of the Director General (DG). Both these
items are highly dangerous.
The 500-strong WTO secretariat staff has a track record of pushing
the agenda of the major powers. The secretariat, rather than
chairpersons, is responsible for drafting language for negotiating
texts which invariably emerge counter to the interests of developing
countries. Similarly, the suggestion to strengthen the role of the
director general should not be taken up. The director general's
position must remain one of neutrality and the DG should not be
engaged in the negotiations. A strengthened role may legitimize the
DG taking positions in the negotiations, which should not be the
case. Even though the current DG is chair of the Trade Negotiations
Committee, his position should be confined to facilitating
negotiations between members, not directing negotiations at his
discretion.
6) Keep the Developing Country Coalitions Together
Civil society groups should rally behind the coalitions that exist
as a political counter-weight to the US-EU alliance. The bullying of
individual countries should be made public. At the national level,
groups on the ground should support and even put pressure on their
governments to play an active role in these coalitions. This is
necessary given the concerted and explicit maneuvers by the US and
EU to break the G-20 as well as the Alliance/G-70 (ACP, African
Union and LDCs). In Brazil for example, splits have been detected
between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, with the Agriculture Minister accusing Foreign Minister
Celso Amorin, who led the G-20 in Cancun, of lining up with
countries like India which is perceived as wanting to protect its
agricultural sector.
How strongly the G-20 and Alliance hold together will be the
determining factor of the outcome of the Hong Kong Ministerial.
7) Medium to Long Term: Towards More Equitable Trading Arrangements
In the long term, civil society groups should look toward
alternatives beyond the WTO and the current bilateral free trade
agreements, both of which are based on putting corporate interests
before people or development. The trading arrangements of the
future - perhaps built more upon South-South cooperation and
partnerships with others of more equal political standing -- should
put people and ecology as the central concerns.
* Aileen Kwa is a trade analyst with Focus on the Global South. She
is based in Geneva.
FOCUS ON TRADE
NUMBER 95, NOVEMBER 2003
https://www.alainet.org/en/articulo/108861
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