Cuba’s Complex Caribbean Identity

Esteban Morales

24/03/2013

Opinión

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Do Cubans see themselves as part of a Caribbean family? Are there historical, social and cultural reasons for a ‘Caribbean Cuba’ and how does the Caribbean appear in the Cuban imaginary?

How are these things conditioned by attitudes to race in Cuban society?

These questions are the subject of an on-going conversation taking place within Cuban academic circles and between Cuban and Anglo-Caribbean scholars.

The exchanges were initiated at the 2012 Cuban International Book Fair during at a Panel discussion on a book commemorating 40 Years of Cuba-Caricom diplomatic relations. They continued at the annual seminar of the Chair in Caribbean Studies at the University of Havana (CCS/UH) in December 2012. Most recently, on February 18, 2013 a group of over twenty Cuban Caribbeanists and cultural scholars met in the Nicolas Guillén room in the headquarters of the Cuban National Union of Writers and Artists (UNEAC) with Norman Girvan and Robert Hill, who were in Havana attending the 2013 Book Fair. The meeting was to continue the discussion and to plan the next colloquium, scheduled for December 3 2013 at the University of Havana.

Speakers included Milagros Martinez of CCS/UH—convenor and chair--Norman Girvan, Esteban Morales,Vilma Diaz and Yolanda Wood.

“Break a vase, and the love that reassembles the fragments is stronger than that love which took its symmetry for granted when it was whole. . . . Antillean art is this restoration of our shattered histories “.

Derek Walcott’s vision for Antillean art might equally be held for the development of a ‘Caribbean consciousness of itself’. In this way the Cuba-Caribbean exchanges could be considered to be part of an on-going process of (re) assembly of our shattered histories related to race and identity; and as an element in the wider discourse on our collective Caribbean civilization.

1804CaribVoices is pleased to be able to share an English translation of the paper presented by Esteban Morales at the February 18 meeting and subsequently revised.

Note: Norman Girvan’s commentary of 2012, which initiated the exchanges, can be accessed here: http://alainet.org/active/52889

Background

Cuba was a racist country before 1959, a legacy of the slave colonial regime established by Spain until the late nineteenth century. Racism was strengthened under the U.S. intervention in the island in the early years of the twentieth century and the republican and dictatorial governments that ruled the country. The revolution that triumphed in 1959 thus inherited the problem as one of the most complex of Cuban society; and in spite of the extent of the social policies undertaken for over fifty years, blacks and mestizos are still disadvantaged relative to whites in many aspects; and manifestations of racism persist in a part of the Cuban population.

Cuban society, in which a significant proportion of the population comprises blacks and mestizos, consisted until 1959 of an economically powerful minority with a very small middle class and a large mass of workers and poor peasants. Blacks and mestizos occupied the lowest social strata, had the least access to wealth and the lowest standards of living. Blacks in particular made up the bulk of the poorest and most neglected social sectors, suffering discrimination by virtue of their skin color.

Up to the mid-1980s, the need to address questions of race was conditioned and constrained by the fear that this would promote social divisiveness. As a result analysis of its elements was avoided, the problem of existing racism has not been resolved and the strengthening of cultural and national identity has been impeded. For these and other historical reasons, there are people in Cuba today who do not want to hear and talk about the issue. Historically, race and the unity of all Cubans have constituted avery negative dynamic that has delayed treatment of racism as an issue that the society must solve. This, because of fear that it will undermine the unity of all Cubans in the face of the imperative of national survival and of the enormous difficulties that the country has had to overcome.

In January 1959, Fidel Castro had addressed the problem of racism, calling it a scourge to be eliminated from the body of Cuban society. His speeches demanded justice for blacks and mestizos especially in at the workplace, but also in social and cultural life. His proposals caused anxiety in some and jubilation in others. For blacks and mestizos there was the expectation that the problem would begin to be solved; for others in the society they became another reason to flee the country, fuelling the process of radicalization of the revolution. This showed the degree of sensibility that existed about race, which a good part of Cuban society at the time was not ready to deal with.

Nonetheless from this point onwards substantial political changes began to take place for the poor in Cuba, including blacks and mestizos. All kinds of opportunities were created that were hitherto unknown to that sector of society: jobs, free health and education, a comprehensive social security system and improved material conditions of life. For the first time on a massive scale, blacks appeared in all sectors of employment and gained access to universities and other research centers. Some took up positions in the state sector; and they were generally able to participate in social, economic and cultural development.

But despite developing a social policy of the highest humanistic content, there were problems that constrained the use of the opportunities that the revolution opened to blacks and mestizos. Although poverty was massively white, wealth had never been black; and the historical points of departure for of whites, blacks and mestizos were very different; putting the latter groups at a disadvantage in making use of the opportunities provided by social policy. Skin colour therefore continued to operate as a strong variable in social differentiation independently of the existence of racism, ultimately worsening the situation of blacks and mestizos. These differences were not taken into account in developing social policy.

The voluntarist declaration made in 1962 to the effect that the problem of race had been solved, the social environment that began to prevail and the social policy of egalitarianism which provided multiple opportunities for all Cubans, produced a significant improvement in living standards for all, including blacks and mestizos. In this situation, organizations of blacks and mestizos began to disappear. They were no longer considered necessary, as the new state and the leadership of the revolutionary government had taken charge of defending their interests. Years later there was discussion as to whether blacks and mestizos had made a mistake in dissolving these organizations and in handing over to the government the responsibility for the struggle to achieve their rightful place within Cuban society.

There ensued a long period during which the role of race in restricting the social development of blacks and mestizos was overlooked, as in pre-revolutionary times. This was the environment in which social, political and mass organisations were created with statutes that did not take account of limitations based on skin colour.

The declaration of Fidel Castro in the closing speech at the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba in 1975, that Cuba is an Afro Latin American country, Cuba’s medical cooperation in Africa, Cuba's participation in the war of liberation in Angola , the establishment of schools for African children in the Isle of Youth, along with campaigns for social equality, also contributed to an environment in which it was believed that the racial problem was being overcome. Together all Cubans, regardless of colour and social background, shared the revolutionary tasks; together they attended same day care centers,school, college, and military training; and together they shared in the fight against terrorist and military attacks from U.S..

All this tended to create a new culture of community and solidarity, generating a situation that helped give credibility to the official discourse that Cuba had no racial problems, which is not to say that this was completely accepted. A tiny part of the black intelligentsia was aware of the fact that the race problem had not disappeared, that white hegemony continued, that the concept of culture that was being defended still did not correspond to what blacks and mestizos should aspire to. But the prevailing political environment did not share those concerns nor facilitate their discussion within Cuban society.

Many citizens, especially blacks and mestizos, were aware that all the problems had not been solved. Nonetheless the level of economic, social and political development attained up to the first half of the 1980s provided grounds for decided optimism that Cuba was finding optimal solutions in all aspects of its internal life.

Hence the triumph of the Revolution in 1959 also gave rise to a process of rescuing Cuba’s national and cultural identity. It advanced the society to a level that now allows it to address resolution of the historical challenges of its Caribbean and Latin American identity.

Cuba and the Caribbean

Caribbean nations, in spite of their wish to become more closely integrated, face a number of challenges in achieving this goal. These include the incompatibility of their economies, many of which produce the same goods and services; major difficulties with transportation; tourism industries that compete rather than cooperate with one another; language differences; ancestral ties with their former colonial powers; and a high level of control of their economies from the United States.

Spain dominated the Insular Caribbean during the sixteenth century. Subsequently it lost control to other powers including England, France and Holland; until left only with Cuba and Puerto Rico. It held on to these islands until the late nineteenth century, when the United States, an emerging imperial nation, displaced Spanish control. Throughout the 18thand 19thcenturies there was a continuous struggle between U.S. ambitions to take control of Cuba, England’s desire to possess the island and Spain’s determination to keep it. The game was not decided until the late nineteenth century (1898) when the United States, by means of subtle maneuvers, finally appropriated the island, implementing a neocolonial model of control it had designed.

Between 1805 and 1823 the United States had formulated its policy of “Manifest Destiny” in anticipation of Cuba’s eventual independence from Spain. Unwilling to wait until that occurred, the United States tried to purchase the island from Spain on no less than seven occasions, or to otherwise to obtain its autonomy. Spain stubbornly held out, but during most of the 19thcentury the United States maintained its objective; constrained only by its internal process of national consolidation. Cuba was very close to the new emerging American empire; and very far from Spain. But having no navy and in the face of British naval supremacy, the U.S. preferred to bide its time and prepare the conditions for an eventual take-over.

Towards 1826, Bolívar also made attempts to enlist Cuba in the struggle for Latin American independence. But the island, then of a reformist bent and faithful to Spain, would have none of it. The U.S. had also been preparing itself provisionally, adding to its so-called "Theory of the Ripe Fruit " the complementary corollary: "while Cuba is not American, it cannot fall into the hands of anyone else". As a consequence, in response to the Bolivarian plan the United States declared loud and clear, "whatever happens in Cuba is the same as if it happens in the mouth of the Mississippi." Bear in mind that in the geostrategic thinking dominant at the time, the island of Cuba appeared to be the result of sedimentation of the sands of the Mississippi in the Gulf of Mexico.

So that while in reality Cuba was, objectively, a part of the Caribbean; its fate as a nation and the formation of its identity were strongly conditioned by a triangular framework of Spanish colonial power intent on maintaining permanent control; U.S. imperial appetites; and the ambitions of England, who had managed to occupy the island between 1762-1763.

In Cuban history for this epoch, the Caribbean appears only in terms of those historical and geographical aspects that are shared with Cuba: the colonial system, the plantation, the slave trade, slavery, the massive population of African origin; and certain contacts with the nearest Caribbean islands brought about by the sugar industry. These are not insignificant, for they constitute an important historical platform of common identity. Nonetheless, politically, Cuba has been completely tied to the designs of Spain and the United States, the two imperial powers which dominated it.

So that when the Cuban nation and its national identity began to take shape towards the mid-nineteenth century, all Caribbean traits were subsumed within a triangle of forces inwhich white Hispanic identity and the strong North American penetration, especially after the U.S. intervention of 1898 -1902, diluted the contribution of the population of African descent and with it, the contribution of the Caribbean in the formation ofnational identity. The latter group was to all intents and purposes excluded from the distribution of power established in Cuba under U.S. leadership.

The United States had begun to penetrate Cuba long before its independence from Spain. By the mid-nineteenth century the U.S. controlled the Cuban economy to the extent that the country had been converted into a neo-colony. All that remained was to exercise sufficient political pressure to prize Cuba definitively into American hands; which was what occurredbetween 1898 and 1902.

As a consequence Cuba’s Caribbean identity became an extremely complex matter. It was, in effect, an incompletely formed identity in which the black element was continually suppressed by the two dominant forces originating in Spainand the United States. This is the situation from which Cuba’s own identity has to be rescued; since both of its black components were victims of the same process.

To summarise, there are several factors to be taken into account in establishing the Caribbean identity as a full component of Cuban identity; and the processes involved are rather complex.

1- Between the Spanish slave colonial regime and U.S. intervention that began even to 1898, Cuba was endowed with an identity in which the Caribbean appears only as a black background; a subsumed and indeed crushed element of what it meant to be Cuban.

2- Cubans themselves, especially black Cubans, always thought of the Caribbean black as a second-class black. It was rare that a Cuban black or mulatto formed a family with a Haitian or Jamaican; and even rarer for a white Cuban, who hardly inter-married either with a black Cuban. A Cuban white man did not marry a Caribbean woman and only rarely married a black Cuban woman. Although Caribbeans were gradually absorbedand assimilated into the population as Cuban, a certain degree of segmentation persisted. This was actually part of the segmentation that affected all blacks and mulattos in Cuba, but especially the so-called Antillanos(Caribbeans/West Indians).

3- The neocolonial Cuban governments practiced discrimination against Antillanos; accepting them only to the extent that they were important as a source of labour for the sugar industry. For virtually the first 30 years of the Republic, Caribbean immigrants were forced to return to their countries after completion of their work in the sugar harvest.

4- Antillanosalways endured the most brutal conditions of exploitation, the worst jobs, the lowest wages and the poorest living conditions, which were almost comparable to conditions of slavery. Slave-like labour conditions were associated with Caribbean labour well into the twentieth century. This situation is clearly evident in the provinces of Camagüey, Oriente and Matanzas.

5- In terms of Caribbean identity, therefore, Cuba is the least Caribbean of Caribbean countries; just as it is the least Latin American country in all Latin America. That is due to the fact that the indigenous component that is characteristic of Latin America barely survived in Cuba; that Spain maintained black slavery in Cuba beyond the conceivable limit; and that U.S. intervention suppressed the formation of an integrated, balanced Cuban identity reflective of all its national components. What exists in Cuba is rather a political will to be Latin Americans and to be Caribbeans, an aspiration rooted in an awareness of shared historical experience. But the conditions under which national identity was forged tend to contradict our actual ‘membership’ of the Caribbean and of Latin America. These identities have to continue being forged, as they have not yet reached their fullest expression.

6- The average Cuban’s consciousness of being ‘Caribbean’ is somewhat like a mirage; not directly identifiable with customs, realities, feelings, or with concrete expressions; but rather with a desire to be. We sense that we are Caribbean, without having the capacity to connect this with our lived reality.

7- Within this complex situation, the manner of treatment of the race question in Cuba historically and to the present day, has greatly impaired development of a Caribbean consciousness; since it is not yet clear what constitutes Cuba’s racial consciousness of itself. The definition of our own racial identity is still a matter of debate, in the context of the continuing existence of racism and racial discrimination. Blackness was, and has always been, the ingredient of our national identity that is most specifically denied and excluded.

8- Since the Revolution the greatest and most outstanding effort made for the validationof our Caribbean identity, has been that made in Santiago de Cuba. Here there are a Center for Caribbean Studies, a Journal of the Caribbean, and an annual Caribbean Festival. But this is not enough, for it does not cover the whole country. Under the cover of recognizing that Santiago is the most Caribbean city of Cuba, the rest of the island vegetates in ignorance of the issue.

9- There is also a Centre for Caribbean Studies at Casa de las Americas, which carries out outstanding Latin American and Caribbean work, headed by Dra. Yolanda Wood.

10- Another important activity is that of Rigoberto Lopez with his Caribbean and African Film Showcase, in tandem with events that take place periodically. However, other filmmakers hardly appear in these activities. Hence there appears to be limited interest in the cultural and cinematographic aspects of this activity, as well in as the African.

11- Very few books on the Caribbean have been published; and even articles and conferences of a scientific nature are scarce. In the National Ballet Festivals, except for the presence of Cuba itself, the Caribbean hardly appears. Caribbean music festivals are almost totally absent. Caribbean music, except in some instances the Steel Band and some music from the Continental Caribbean, is hardly heard or sold in Cuba.

12- Caribbean culture is too little known and not sufficiently promoted in Cuba. That also holds for African culture. How can the Caribbean consciousness necessary for integration be developed, if the Caribbean is unknown in Cuba? There exists only an elementary awareness, neither deeply rooted nor adequately nourished, that Cuba is a Caribbean island.

13- Puerto Rico is the only Caribbean country identified by ordinary Cubans, in an elementary manner, as part of the Caribbean.

14- At the University of Havana, Milagros Martínez, together with Prof. Digna Castañeda, leads a Caribbean Studies Group. But this does not cover all the requirements of the subject; nor does it appear to have the necessary institutional support. It has not so far materialized into a Center of Caribbean Studies which could give coherence to its work. As a result the subject of the Caribbean suffers the same level of neglect experienced by Racial Studies at the University. Both themes touch on the subject of the African-descended presence in Cuba. Other subjects, such as European, Asian, Latin American, and even African studies have had better luck in our national scientific policy.

Actually, In strengthening our Caribbean identity and in validating what connects us to the Caribbean, we are doingnothing new and nothing more than what we simply have to do. For it involves rescuing a component of our own, as yet incomplete, identity.

We need more efforts, more recognized and supported by the Cuban government, and more institutional support, for the Caribbean to occupy its rightful place in Cuba. Defending our Caribbean identity is a means of bringing us into a relationship with the historical roots that most immediately link us to Africa, especially if we understand the continuing colonial policiesthroughout our history, by both Spain and the United States, to de-Africanize and to whiten us. Hence, to fortify that spirit within the body of the nation is to defend that component of our identity which distinguishes us and empowers us to share, on equal terms, with the Hispanic element in our culture, which has always been hegemonic and which still struggles to remain so. Otherwise, we will continue to be the ‘white Cuba’ that has been imposed on us over the centuries.

In the Caribbean context, this means defending the principle of unity within diversity. Unity within diversity is what endows the Caribbean with its special cultural and economic strength in the world. Without this there is Balkanisation, allowing the imperial powers to take advantage ofdifferences to divide the region. But integration is only feasible when diversity is respected as an endogenous characteristic, rather than seen as an obstacle. The Caribbean as a whole has all the natural, biological and human resources to constitute itself as a region which, together with Latin America, can become an actor on the global stage.

There is no other way to present ourselves to the world, or to any part of it, but as a Cuba that is still in the process of strengthening its own true identity. It cannot be asserted that this has been completely accomplished; it is a daily struggle, in all places and in all possible forms; to achieve what we really ought to be: complete Cubans. That is, a blend of Spaniards, Africans, Caribbeans and Asians.

Nowthat Cuba presides over CELAC, we should try to unite our internal efforts to properly equip Caribbean Studies, to provide an academic-scientific platform to support a major advance in knowledge of the Caribbean. There needs to be Increased cultural contacts and exchanges; establishment of a full Center for Caribbean Studies at the University of Havanna, which in coordination with the one existing in Santiago de Cuba and the Casa de Las Americas, produces more books and promotes greater knowledge of the countries of the Caribbean.

If we really want to do a good job in the CELAC presidency, we need more than simply four Cubans or brilliant Caribbeans producing excellent reports in CELAC. Many people should be involved in this work—and we have them—generating a large intellectual and cultural production to support a systematic Caribbean policy and Caribbean integration. And it is not only a matter of having a policy, however brilliant, since policies, once executed, become exhausted. What is needed is creation of an adequate, living intellectual platform for policies to continuously updated and renovated. (Translation: Norman Girvan.)

Havana, February 25 2013

- Esteban Morales is Professor of Economics and Political Science, and Honorary Director of the Center for American Studies, at the University of Havana; and Member of the Commission Against Racism and Racial Discrimination of the National Union of Cuban Writers and Artists-UNEAC. Visit his blog at http://www.estebanmoralesdominguez.blog

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