Brazil’s conservatives, after losing four consecutive presidential elections to the Workers’ Party (PT) since 2002, have managed to reorganise, overthrow President Dilma Rousseff and replace her with her former vice-president Michel Temer. This manoeuvre, of more than dubious legality, would have been less easily accomplished if the PT had not made so many mistakes. It gave up courting popular support; formed repeated alliances with different sectors of the right (some of which later worked to overthrow it); and chose to respond to the economic crisis with austerity, at the risk of worsening social discontent. These decisions have made it hard to produce an adequate response to the right’s offensive.

Temer has set to work without delay. His prescription combines unbridled economic liberalism with militant political conservatism. His first decisions herald social regression on a scale unprecedented in Brazil’s recent history.

The makeup of his government suggests that diversity and equality are not priorities. It includes no women and no people of colour, only elderly white men, many of them suspected of corruption, with links to regional oligarchies. The human rights and agrarian reform ministries have gone, and Temer nearly got rid of the culture ministry too, only relenting after indignant protests from the art world, which had not been so horrified at the elimination of the other portfolios.

Temer’s programme may have won the support of banks and big business, but it has never been put to a vote. At a meeting with Brazilian business leaders, Temer promised not to stand for re-election, emphasising that this would leave him free to ‘prioritise budgetary adjustments’: He can afford to be firm because he does not fear paying a political price for the measures he imposes — which are likely to be harsh. His economic programme centres on a constitutional amendment to cap public spending (PEC 55, previously PEC 241); a ‘reform’ of social security; and a ‘relaxation’ of labour legislation.

PEC 55 freezes public investment in all sectors of the economy for 20 years. Federal spending will rise only in line with inflation until 2037; it will not grow in real terms, unlike the population. This measure, synonymous with the collapse of public services and an end to social programmes, is unprecedented internationally. Philip Alstom, UN special rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, warned of its consequences in a communiqué dated 9 December 2016. The government’s justification is the urgency of curbing the budget deficit and repaying public debt (which has been rising since 2014, though it is only equivalent to 66% of GDP, lower than in many European countries). PEC 55 was approved by the chamber of deputies then by the senate on 13 December.

The reform of social security is no less alarming. Temer has taken up, and extended, an idea put forward by Rousseff that already implied curtailing rights. The details have yet to be presented to the congress, but it is known that it involves raising the legal retirement age to 65 (at present, Brazilians can retire earlier if they have paid enough contributions). That’s beyond life expectancy in some regions of Brazil.

Temer hopes to realise his ambition of relaxing labour legislation and reducing the ‘cost’ of labour by allowing subcontracting in all business sectors and giving collective bargaining precedence over law. This picks up on a bill already being considered by the congress that would permit contracts that contravene the law, provided they have been agreed by employees and management.

These proposals eventually won the support of an initially hesitant business elite for the parliamentary right’s plan to impeach Rousseff. She had tried to appease them by laying the foundations of a structural adjustment in 2015 and contemplating a reform of social security, but her measures worsened the recession and popular dissatisfaction; banks and big business felt she showed insufficient determination and chose to replace her with Temer.

Rousseff’s removal from office marked the end of a cycle in Brazil. For 13 years, the PT had worked to strengthen an arrangement that promoted social progress and improved living standards for the poorest without threatening the interests of the richest. Poverty fell while profits soared. Lula was the architect of a policy of ‘conciliation’.

The lower echelons of society benefited from policies that raised the minimum wage and increased spending capacity among the working class, as well as social programmes to combat poverty or improve access to higher education, housing and healthcare. The higher echelons enjoyed loans from the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and generous tax exemptions. Their historical privileges were never questioned. The tax regime, which provided very little income redistribution, was not modified, nor was the level of concentration of rural and urban real estate. The PT maintained — and even strengthened — the policy aimed at building a primary surplus so as to guarantee the repayment of the debt, much of which was held by Brazil’s dominant classes. It never challenged the private sector’s grip on the media, nor eradicated the corruption that lubricated the political system it had inherited.

This agreement, presented as a win-win, would not have been possible without economic growth, which was significant (4% on average during Lula’s two terms in office), thanks to a favourable international situation with rising consumer goods prices and a growing Chinese economy. The government was able to accumulate foreign currency reserves and increase social investment without any structural reform.

This model collapsed with the 2008 crisis. In 2009 Lula’s counter-cyclical policy was initially able to maintain growth and delay a catastrophe. But by 2014, when Rousseff was in charge, the win-win agreement showed signs of failure. The room for manoeuvre to conciliate interests became limited, and Rousseff’s response — pro-cyclical austerity — precipitated the crisis.

The crisis became apparent during the demonstrations of June 2013, which marked the end of the social consensus that had ensured the PT’s hegemony. Operation Lava Jato (car wash), intended to fight corruption, tarnished the party’s image while reducing the investment capacity of national oil company Petrobras and other big businesses. The government’s parliamentary base imploded just as the right was regrouping. It became impossible to ignore the PT’s strategic defeat and institutional collapse.

This situation gave the Brazilian left and social movements new problems. The rout of the PT eliminated all the progressive camp and facilitated the conservative and liberal offensive. Corruption scandals undermined the moral authority of those who represented the left in the eyes of the Brazilian people. And the PT’s failure to self-criticise, or realise that its strategy was exhausted, aggravated the crisis.

The PT dominated the Brazilian left for 35 years, serving as a meeting place for social and progressive forces. Its ability to fulfil this role is diminished. This does not mean it is dead. Lula still enjoys strong popular support; he is probably the best option for the next presidential election, despite facing legal investigations and abuse from the media. But the PT has lost much of its dynamism and ability to mobilise. It has aged.

How will the left react, given that a force able to fill the void left by the PT has yet to emerge? There is significant opposition, notably to PEC 55 and to corruption among political leaders — the president of the senate, Renan Calheiros, has been charged with embezzling public funds. There have been large demonstrations by the Brazilian Homeless Workers’ Movement (MTST) in major cities. On the political front, some look to the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL), which though small, is made up of combative MPs who have left the PT to form a party further to the left. But these initiatives are as yet not enough to be a solution.

So the progressives’ first challenge is to encourage protest against the Temer government. Success will depend on the ability of social movements to join forces and get the working class to understand the seriousness of the government’s plans. Its second challenge is to acknowledge that the time of consensus is over, and to build a new political camp. Today, it is impossible to achieve the slightest social advance without conflict or confrontation. The elite and the right have understood this.

How can the left prevent social and political dissatisfaction — amplified by the crisis — from being harnessed by the ‘new right’, which has used popular anger to its advantage through outsiders such as Donald Trump in the US, Nigel Farage in the UK, or Marine Le Pen in France?

The left urgently needs to rediscover the radicalism that it consciously set aside when it came to power: democratic radicalism, aimed at promoting political participation and representing Brazil’s diversity; and strategic radicalism, with an ambitious programme of social change that can rekindle hope (transformation of the political system and production model, media reform). The institutional shape that this camp will take is not yet clear, nor how long it will take to form. But the need for it is becoming apparent.

- Guilherme Boulos is coordinator of the Brazilian Homeless Workers’ Movement (MTST) and the People Without Fear Front (PSM). Translated by Charles Goulden.

Copyright ©2017 Le Monde diplomatique — used by permission of Agence Global