The Business of War

The origin of the FARC is different from that of other militant groups. Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, a Liberal leader and populist caudillo detested by the intransigent Colombian oligarchy, was assassinated in 1948. The murder of this famous figure led to a major popular revolt, El Bogotazo, and to La Violencia (the Violence), a long period of warfare between Liberals and Conservatives that took the lives of 200,000 people. Persecuted ferociously by the State, the Liberals and Communists took shelter in remote and inaccessible regions and resisted for more than a decade. Eventually, many of them regrouped in what would become the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) when it was founded on May 5, 1966, as the armed wing of the Communist Party.

The liberal origins of many of the FARC's members—among them Manuel Marulanda Vélez, Tirofijo (Sharpshooter), its principal leader—distinguishes it from most of the continent's guerrilla movements. In the 1960s, the Liberal and Communist guerrillas were coming together in "liberated zones" where they founded "independent republics," such as Marquetalia.

A second and even more important facet has its roots in the campesinos' need to defend themselves from landholders who marginalized them and expropriated much of their land, and in doing so, forced them to the edges of agricultural areas. At its roots the Colombian guerrilla movement was formed to function like campesino self-defense groups in the face of the extreme violence by those in power.

Until the beginning of the 1980s, the FARC had between 1,000 and 3,000 combatants. In May 1984, the signing of a peace agreement by President Belisario Betancourt led to a cease-fire and the creation of the Unidad Patriótica (UP), making participation in elections and legitimate political life possible. But the joint actions of drug traffickers, paramilitaries, and the State annihilated the UP. In just a few years, between 2,000 and 4,000 UP sympathizers and leaders were assassinated.

Beginning in 1986, during the administration of Virgilio Barco, a peace process was undertaken with the M-19, the EPL, the PRT, and the Quintín Lame Armed Movement, which, together with the FARC and the ELN, formed the Coordinadora Simón Bolívar (Simón Bolívar Coalition). As part of the peace process, a constitutional assembly was convened. Then, on Dec. 9, 1990, the day the assembly participants were elected and as peace was being negotiated with the FARC, the army without any warning launched an offensive against the legendary Casa Verde (Green House), headquarters of the guerrilla group's secretariat.

Its financing is an important factor. Of its income, that is, several billion dollars annually, 78% is obtained by participating in drug trafficking, according to the Colombian government. A substantial part comes from the "gram tax" paid by campesinos and traffickers for each gram they produce. The same source claims that another $600 million comes from "vaccinations," that is, through extortion and kidnapping. The remainder of the income comes from rustling landholders' cattle.

That between 20% and 30% of its members are minors—many recruited by force, according to a report by Human Rights Watch—has been a second factor in the FARC's delegitimization. Third are the methods it employs, which are often very similar to those the paramilitary and the Armed Forces use. The FARC has massacred campesinos and indigenous groups, and Amnesty International also accuses it of human rights violations. Finally, the broadcasting of images and testimonies about hostages and prisoners, some kept in chains for five, six, and even more years, has been a death knell for its already waning credibility.

But there is something even worse. The average Colombian perceives that the war harms them and benefits the powerful. At the service of new forms of accumulation, the paramilitaries offer a plan for reconstruction and order, in which open-pit mining and biofuels are the new booms.

In 1998, a new peace process was begun under President Andrés Pastrana and a 40,000 km² demilitarized zone was created. In 2002, this came to an end amid accusations that the FARC was participating in drug trafficking and practicing forced recruitment of minors. Meanwhile, the Pastrana administration was negotiating the Plan Colombia to strengthen the State and win the conflict.

Since 2000, under the Uribe administration, things have only gotten worse. The FARC had to retreat, and it has lost many members, but above all, it has lost the military and political initiative. Nevertheless, the policies of Washington and the Uribe administration are insufficient to explain the FARC's brutal isolation, which represents its political defeat and most likely, its future disappearance as a significant group.