The Lula administration and the struggle for a new Brazil
28/09/2004
- Opinión
In the opening of its annual session, the UN's General Assembly
2004 was stage to a great dispute. On one side, the warlord,
George W. Bush, isolated and defending a policy condemned all
over the world, causing insecurity and instability, threatening
the peace and safety of all countries and peoples. On the other
side, a broad current of leaders who defend peace, international
cooperation, the development of a new international economic and
political order. One of the most distinguished chiefs of state
on the latter side was Brazilian President Luis Inácio Lula da
Silva. His speech and the actions he proposed to fight
inequalities instead of the current war policy achieved great
repercussion.
Every time President Lula makes pronouncements and gestures of
that sort the international progressive forces turn their eyes
to Brazil and analyze the nature of our country's evolving
political process. Foreign friends who are sympathetic to the
struggles of the Brazilian people insistently question us if the
balance of the first stage of the Lula administration is
positive and ask which paths it will take from now on. Not
pretending to clear all doubts, I expose below what, in my
opinion, synthesizes he experience of the Brazilian left-wing
forces in the government.
After almost two years since the electoral victory of the
Brazilian left-wing forces led by Luis Inácio Lula da Silva in
2002, the fulfillment of political, economic and social changes
that motivated the struggles of the Brazilian people over
decades, determining the election of Lula and being inscribed in
the electoral platform is still in the agenda as a fundamental
and urgent need, though with an uncertain destiny, in case we
face the international and national correlation of forces, as
well as the existence of diametrically opposed views regarding
its range inside the government and among parties that
constitute the broad governmental coalition.
It is still too early to make a conclusive assessment of the
Lula administration. "Singing victory" when we have not yet
reached half the presidential mandate is a velleity in which the
consequent left cannot indulge. Foreseeing failure is a nihilist
attitude that is today the touchstone of national right's policy
— which is still bewildered with the defeat suffered in 2002 —
and of an inconsequent and counter-revolutionary "ultra-left",
which bases its political action on frustrating the expectations
of the masses and creating and artificial environment prone to
adventures. Both postures are far-out and harmful to the
struggle of the Brazilian people for national and social
emancipation.
The Brazilian progressive forces and the popular movement
struggle to transform Brazil amid peculiar conditions that
define its pace. International context is adverse and still
characterized by the heavy effects of the defeat of socialism in
the USSR and East Europe; by the retraction of the revolutionary
movement in the world; by the predominance of an interventionist
and warmongering policy practiced by the United States'
imperialism — a voracious and aggressive super-power committed
to impose its absolute domain on countries and peoples; by an
unprecedented offensive against labor rights and national
sovereignties of dependent countries, despite the intensifying
resistance struggle that can be observed all over the world, a
factor that inspires hope and stimulates the search for
alternatives.
In a still unfavorable situation, how to implement changes,
change courses and advance towards structural transformations —
which are revolutionary in their core — in a politically and
socially complex country of continental dimensions such as
Brazil, living a reality where the government was conquered not
by revolutionary means, but by an electoral victory? The
progressive forces, among which the communists, have a
historical opportunity to outline the answer to so acute issues
as those not by means of manuals, but with practical exercises,
with the daily search and adoption of solutions to solid
problems and adequate political answers to recurrent disputes
allowed by the present situation.
Lula's election is the result of a set of objective and
subjective factors, among which we highlight the collapse of the
neoliberal model, the temporary rupture of the political scheme
that supported former President "Professor" Cardoso's
government, the increasing dissatisfaction of the popular masses
and the formation of a broad political-electoral front
constituted by left-wing forces, such as Lula's Workers Party
(the major force), the Communist Party of Brazil (an ally since
Lula's first candidacy in 1989), the Brazilian Socialist Party
and center forces, such as Vice President's Liberal Party, among
others. The positive result of the elections was not reproduced
in the elections for the House of Representatives, the Senate
and state governments, which play a relevant political role in
the Brazilian federative Republic. That was another unfavorable
condition added to preexistent ones, forcing the new
administration to form new, broader alliances in order to obtain
the necessary political stability what was fulfilled by dividing
the opposing camp, attracting to the government's side another
center force, the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement,
which was part of the previous government's supporting base. The
importance of such demarche can be measured in contrast to the
ill omens uttered by the defeated forces, including a good
amount of prejudice regarding Lula's class origin and political
trajectory, who was viewed as someone not even able to take the
first steps and doomed to succumb to difficulties.
Therefore, Brazil is facing the peculiar circumstance of having
the left in the heart of Republican power, but yet unable to
constitute a strictly left-wing government. Replacing the
neoliberal, anti-popular, anti-democratic and anti-national
administration led by "Professor" Cardoso, we have a government
constituted by a broad national coalition with the Workers Party
and Lula's leadership at its core, with the participation of
progressive and center forces. It is the first time since the
military coup 40 years ago that Brazil sees a government with
such constitution of forces. If, on the one hand, President
Lula's government gained political stability with its broadness,
on the other hand, the pace of changes became slower. If, on the
one hand, there is the possibility of resisting with more safety
to the present neoliberal, anti-democratic and anti-social
international offensive with a government of national coalition,
on the other hand, the commitments made with center-right
political sectors, branches of dominant classes polarized by
traditional party chieftains, conditioned the form, character
and pace of the reforms performed by the government, some of
which confuse, many others unnecessary and contradictory in
contrast to the government's progressive sense and national,
popular aspirations.
Communists have characterized President Lula's government, since
its formation and since they accepted the challenge of taking
part of the Ministries under Lula's invitation, as a "disputing"
government where forces of change, bearers of a national
development project that value labor and social justice and that
open the way to building a sovereign and progressive nation,
coexist with forces willing to conform to the previous model,
bearers of a withered neoliberalism, unable to conceive and put
into practice alternatives to a model that proved to be useless
to the country and, therefore, condemned not only by history,
but also by ballots cast in the urns. But the fact that the Lula
administration stands out due to its democratic and patriotic
character, as well as to the commitments made to recover social
justice, is indisputable.
It is with such parameters that one should evaluate the Lula
administration in the short period since the President took
office.
The democratic character
In the history of the Brazilian Republic, which completes 115
years in November, there has never been such democracy and
dialogue between popular movements and the nation's highest
officer. Unionists, students, farmers, landless peasants, women,
in fact, all segments of the Brazilian population have President
Lula as a patient interlocutor. The government acknowledges the
social movement as the force that elected it and, therefore, as
a fundamental constitutive part of its supporting base. In
almost two years of government, the general feeling is that
police repression to social movements belongs to the past. It is
not something with little importance in a country where the
social issue was always treated as a "police case" — often as a
military one — a case of national security. And I am not
referring only to the "old Republic's" methods or those of the
dictatorships that marked our history, but to the very
government of "Professor" Cardoso's Party of Brazilian Social
Democracy, which authorized the invasion of an oil refinery that
was on strike and persecuted the union movement with
unimaginable cruelty for a Sorbonne academic.
Lula inaugurated a method of consulting society's organized
sectors that allows him to collect and systematize proposals
made by popular movements in order to design public policies.
Therefore, in one year and a half, many conferences were held,
among which the Women, Sports, Human Rights, Cities (addressing
issues such as housing and sanitation), Health and Youth (which
was organized by the House of Representatives) conferences.
Those conferences were preceded by intense debate and
mobilization from the lower ranks in municipalities. The
presence of the President of the Republic, Ministers and
officers specialized in the fields addressed in the conferences
does not intimidate delegates who, with typical Brazilian
irreverence and the responsibility of representing communities
and social movements, do not spare the government of criticism
and formulate claims and proposals with clarity.
The existence of a democratic government in Brazil is a great
achievement that has been ripening since the end of dictatorship
in 1985, the Constituent Assembly in 1987-88 and now is
consolidated during Lula's mandate. In Brazil, we have had some
short periods of democracy in the 115 years of the Republic. In
general it has been oligarchic, dictatorial and fascist
governments and, more recently, the joint domain of the
interests of a neoliberal, financial elite. Democracy is
exception.
A sovereign foreign policy
Since March 2003, when Lula finished a call made by United
States' President Bush with a sound NO to his request for
Brazilian support in the invasion of Iraq, the sign that clear
changes were beginning to be implemented also in the Brazilian
foreign policy was given. The foreign policy, conducted with
serenity and ability by the Ministry of External Relations, is
the distinctive trait of the Lula administration as a patriotic
government that exerts national sovereignty with responsibility
in a disturbed world, under an unbalanced, unfair and
threatening international order. The government's action
regarding foreign policy has been the incessant search for
granting a new spot for Brazil in the world according to
national expectations for peace, sovereignty and development.
Brazil will not find that place in case it remains on the side
of imperialist powers, submitted to the rule of inequality and
warmongering policies, but on the side of its Latin American
neighbors, as well as standing by other fraternal, poor or
developing countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Lula
inaugurated a new presidential diplomacy that deals with great
powers in a stately manner, at the same time trying to diversify
our relations according to the argument that an international
order characterized by unilateralism does not contribute to the
progress of humankind or to national development.
The balance of achievements in that field is very positive: the
efforts to integrate Latin America and strengthen Mercosur;
solidarity towards Cuba and Venezuela; weakening and delaying
the FTAA; the struggle against rich countries' protectionism,
the creation of the G-20 during the WTO meeting in Cancun — a
high point; the help to African countries and the initiative of
proposing an international debate on fighting poverty. Those are
great achievements if we consider that Brazil was traditionally
submissive to the United States' imperialism. The exercise of
national sovereignty is also an exception in our Republican
history.
The Achilles heel
Although democracy and foreign policy are the most positive
traits of the Lula administration up till now and the
endorsement the President enjoys results from the reaffirmation
made speech after speech of his social commitments, the general
orientation of the economic policy is too feeble. It is clear
that the Lula administration has made a conservative choice
regarding the economic policy and has submitted to the pressure
of IMF, international banks and local financial advisers. Now,
with small signs of economic growth manifested this year on a
compressed basis (a –0.2% recession last year), there is much
hubbub with the pretension of canonizing the economic policy, as
if the growth signs were its result. The government is still
prisoner of the previous logic: generate more and more domestic
and foreign surpluses in order to finance the payment of
domestic and foreign debts and maintain high interest rates, as
well as a floating exchange with the free flow of capitals, what
means focusing the dynamics of national economy on high
remuneration of creditors. It is a mean and anti-social logic,
since it withdraws colossal resources from the productive
economy that are transferred to financial market monopolists,
what can be done only by means of cutting social rights. In at
least two occasions, forced by the conditions of such economic
policy and submitting to the rules of IMF — which continues to
monitor economic management — counting with the consent of a
docile economic staff led by Minister of Finance Antônio
Palocci, a former Trotskyist converted to neoliberal dogmas, the
Lula administration made efforts to approve in the National
Congress (both the House of Representatives and the Senate)
anti-popular and anti-social measures, such as the conclusion of
the social security reform initiated by the previous government
and a minimum wage raise that was below expectations and the
government's payment capacity, since in the occasion (second
quarter, 2004) an unprecedented increase in governmental
revenues and, as a consequence, in fiscal surplus was
registered, much more than the amount the necessary according to
agreements made with the IMF.
Under the same pressures — and with the aid of union summits
that are too far from the interests of workers — preparations
are being hastened in order to promote "union" and "labor"
reforms that ambiguously combine some of the democratizing and
sanitizing measures regarding union life with the unacceptable
attempt to make labor laws "flexible", an euphemism with which
they intend to attack rights that were historically achieved by
Brazilian workers.
The economic policy put into practice in the first half of
President Lula's mandate is incompatible with the needs for
national development and for facing the most severe Brazilian
social crisis. With such economic policy we will neither be able
to overcome the country's structural crisis nor open the way to
long-term sustained development. Pointing out a new path,
following a different way that leads to a new model of national
development that values labor and social justice is the great
challenge of Lula's progressive and reforming government.
In order to do that, besides reinforcing the unity of the
democratic and progressive forces that constitute the
government, the main challenge of the consequent left, including
the Communist Party, is to promote the political and ideological
struggle along with the popular movement's democratic and
legitimate pressures, assuring solid convictions that change is
possible and necessary, that there are alternatives to
neoliberalism also in the economic field, even though by means
of a gradual course.
The assessment that can be made of the Lula administration in
the moment must, therefore, avoid univocal approaches. We are
living the initial moment of a transition that may take longer
than we expected when we celebrated victory. There are visible
difficulties, some of them are objective in their character,
others are related to limited horizons and the social-democratic
character of the party force leading the process and exerting
hegemony in the governmental coalition. To the consequent left,
namely to communists, the important thing is not to lose track,
having the courage to take the necessary steps and trust that
the circumstances we are experiencing now in Brazil will bring
valuable positive results in the future of the struggle for the
Brazilian people's national and social emancipation.
* José Reinaldo Carvalho is Journalist, Vice President of the
Communist Party of Brazil, person in charge of International
Relations and director of Cebrapaz – Brazilian Center of
Solidarity to the Peoples and Struggle for Peace.
https://www.alainet.org/en/active/6862?language=en
Del mismo autor
- Há 58 anos, o golpe militar aniquilou a democracia, os direitos do povo e a soberania nacional 31/03/2022
- Os EUA querem dar lições aos outros, mas são o país que mais viola os direitos humanos no mundo 21/04/2021
- Política de Biden aumenta tensões internacionais e levanta o alerta em movimentos de solidariedade 19/03/2021
- Intentona golpista expõe as vísceras de um império em acentuado declínio 07/01/2021
- Não tira não, Mr. Pompeo 21/09/2020
- A China se apresenta no ‘front’ militar como fator de paz 04/08/2020
- China versus EUA: um confronto que pode durar décadas 27/07/2020
- Governo Bolsonaro quer ir à guerra contra a Venezuela 16/07/2020
- China e Rússia firmam aliança contra ameaças dos EUA 13/07/2020
- Por que Netanyahu ainda não executou a anexação da Palestina 09/07/2020