Mercosur, Unasur and the indecision of Brazil

Atilio Boron

11/07/2013

Opinión

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Recent weeks were prodigal in events that revealed the impact of the Washington counteroffensive, in effect a campaign to dynamite diverse integrationist processes in Latin America. Today Mercosur and Unasur are the obvious targets, but CELAC is also in their sights and to the extent that it reveals greater influence in hemispheric affairs it will also become the object of bitter attacks. One of the weapons recently launched by the White House has been the Pacific Alliance, a typical creature of the superpower to mobilize their pawns south of the Rio Grande and to employ them as "Trojan horses" in order to fulfil the designs of the Empire. Another such alliance, "badly engendered" according to the notable Argentinean historian and journalist Gregorio Selser, was invented at the beginnings of the nineteen-sixties by John F. Kennedy to destroy the Cuban Revolution. This was called "the Alliance for Progress", which in its time fueled a number of pessimistic predictions among anti-imperialists, was a resounding fiasco. The present one does not appear destined to work any better. But defeating it will demand, as did its predecessor, signal amounts of firm action and intelligence on the part of social movements, political forces, and governments opposed -- in various degrees, as is obvious when one looks at the regional panorama -- to imperialism. Political and organizational weakness and impediments together with credulous attitudes towards White House promises, or the absurd illusions provoked by the siren songs of Washington, would open the way for a phenomenal defeat for the peoples of Our America.

In this sense the chronic indecision of Brasilia with respect to their role in integrationist projects under way in Our America is a cause for preoccupation. And this, for a reason that is easily understandable. Henry Kissinger, who in addition to his status as a war criminal has that of serious analyst of the international scene, made this clear when, satisfied with the alignment of the Brazilian military dictatorship after the overthrow of João Goulard, he forged a phrase that made history. He said that "where Brazil tends to go, there will Latin America go." This is not quite as clear today, since the Bolivarian movement has changed the sociopolitical map of the region for the better, but even so the weight of Brazil on a hemispheric level is still very important. If their government will resolutely support the diverse integrationist processes (Mercosur, Unasur, CELAC) history will change. But Washington has been working for some time on the political, diplomatic and military leadership of Brazil to urge that country to moderate its intervention in these processes, and has achieved considerable success. For example, exploiting the naive credulity of Itamaraty when the United States promises to guarantee Brazil a permanent seat on the security council of the United Nations, while India and Pakistan (two nuclear powers) or Indonesia (the largest Muslim country in the world) and Egypt, Nigeria (the biggest population in Africa), Japan and Germany, without going any further, would have to put up with their present status as transitional members of this body. Another hypothesis indicates that this may not be merely a question of naïveté because the option of an intimate alliance with Washington seduces many in Brasilia. An indication of this is that a few days after assuming office, the present foreign minister of Dilma Rousseff, Antonio Patriota, granted an extended interview with Paulo Cesar Pereira, of the review Veja. The first question that the journalist asked was: "in all your years as a professional diplomat, what is the image you formed of the United States?" The reply was astounding, if only because it came from a man who one assumes should defend Brazil's national interest, through institutions such as Mercosur, Unasur and CELAC participate actively in promoting the self determination of the countries in the area: "It is difficult to speak objectively because I have an emotional (sic!) attachment to the United States through my family, my wife and her family. There are aspects of U.S. society that I admire very much." (1).

It would have been reasonable that he should be asked to resign immediately due to "emotional incompatibility" for the exercise of his responsibility, to speak somewhat delicately. But this did not happen. Why? Because it is obvious that in Brazil two tendencies coexist: one, moderately Latin-Americanist, that prospered as never before under the government of Lula, and another that thinks that the future splendour of Brazil involves an intimate association with the United States and, in part, with Europe, and this tendency recommends that [Brazil] forget her rebellious neighbours. This current is hardly hegemonic inside the Planalto Palace but there is no doubt that today it finds much more receptive ears than previously.

This change in the balance of power between these tendencies appeared in numerous occasions in recent days. In spite of being one of the countries spied on by the United States, and that Brazil indicated that the fact was "extremely grave", it was immediately made public that political asylum would not be granted to Edward Snowdon, who had denounced the very serious offence against the South American giant. Another item: the very slow reaction of the Brazilian President to the kidnapping of Evo Morales last week: if the presidents of Cuba, Ecuador, Venezuela and Argentina (as well as the General Secretary of Unasur, Alí Rodriguez) waited only a few minutes after the news came out to express their disagreement with what happened and their solidarity with the Bolivian President, Rousseff needed almost fifteen hours to do so, after even the declarations of the General Secretary of the OEA, whose condemnation was almost coincidental with that of the first responders. There were conflicts and tugs of war within the government, and an unlikely pretext (the massive popular protests of a few days before, already quieted) prevented the Brazilian president from assisting at the meeting of presidents that took place in Cochabamba, a city located two hours from Brasilia by air, thus weakening the global impact of this meeting and objectively coordinating its action with the strategy of the Pacific Alliance that, as President Rafael Correa suggested, blocked what should have been an extraordinary summit of presidents of Unasur.

For Latin America to be freed from neocolonial shackles, the participation of Brazil is decisive. But this will not be possible except a few drops at a time unless a resolution is taken in favour of Latin America in the conflict between these two opposed projects. This not only makes Brazil a vacillating actor in such initiatives as Mercosur or Unasur, something that has a negative impact on the international movement, but this also leads to a dangerous paralysis in certain crucial domestic questions. For example, the fact of not being able since 2009 to decide where to purchase 36 fighter planes that are needed to control their immense territory, and especially the great Amazonian or sub-Amazonian basin, in spite of the risk implied in putting off the acquisition of aircraft apt for such a delicate task. One part of the high command and the political and diplomatic bureaucracy favour re-equipment with U.S. aircraft, while the other looks to acquire them in Sweden, France or Russia. Not even Lula was able to resolve the question. This absurd paralysis would be easily resolved if those involved in the decision would ask themselves a simple question: How many military bases do each of the countries offering aircraft to oversee our territory have in the region? If the question were asked, the answer would be as follows: Russia and Sweden have none, France has an aerospace base in French Guyana, administered jointly with Nato and with a presence of US military personnel; the United States, on the other hand, has 76 military bases in the region, a handful of them rented and/or co-administered with third countries such as the United Kingdom, France or the Netherlands. Some Itamaraty bureaucrat or Brazilian military person trained in West Point could consider that these are found in faraway places, that they are in the Caribbean and have as their mission to keep their eyes on Bolivarian Venezuela. But they would be wrong. The hard reality is that while Venezuela is surrounded by 13 U.S. military bases installed in border countries, Brazil is literally surrounded by 23 such bases, or 25 if one adds two British overseas bases that the U.S. can count on -- through Nato -- in the Ecuatorial and South Atlantic, in Ascension Island and the Malvinas. By chance the great underwater petroleum deposits of Brazil are found halfway between these military installations. (2)

In the face of this evidence, how is it possible to hold any doubt about sourcing the aircraft that Brazil needs? The only realistic hypothesis of a conflict that this country (and all of Latin America) has is with the United States. In this part of the world there are some that foresee a conflict with China, avid to access the immense natural resources of the region. But while China is invading the region with an endless amount of supermarkets, Washington does it with all the force of their phenomenal military muscle, particularly surrounding Brazil. And in case it might be needed, George W. Bush reactivated the Fourth Fleet (in another of these big "chance happenings" of history!) just a few weeks after President Lula announced the discovery of a large field of petroleum off the Paulist coast. In spite of this we have the lamentable lack of action on the part of Brasilia. Is it that these leaders are ignorant of the lessons of history? Do they not know that John Quincy Adams, the sixth president of the country to the north, said that "the United States does not have permanent friendships, but only permanent interests"? Do the officials in charge of these affairs not know that from the moment that President Hugo Chávez began to have differences with Washington, the White House put an embargo on any supplies of parts, repairs and renewal of aero-navigation and combat systems for the fleet of F-16s possessed by Venezuela, so that these could not be utilized and had to be replaced. It doesn't take much intelligence to imagine what could happen in the hardly improbable case of a serious conflict between Brazil and the United States over a dispute concerning, for example, access to certain strategic minerals found in Amazonia, or to the "pre-salt" petroleum; or, in the worst case scenario, if Brazil were to decide not to accompany Washington in a military adventure to produce a "regime change" in some country of Latin America or the Caribbean, repeating the model employed in Libya or which is now being undertaken with blood and fire in Syria. In this hypothetical case of Brazil refusing to fulfil their commitments, it would warrant the same "disloyal ally" reprisal as that applied to Chávez, and Brazil would be defenceless. One could hope that these hard realities could be discussed publicly and that this great South American nation could begin to determine clearly where are their friends and who are their enemies, even though today they are disguised in sheep's clothing. This could put an end to its chronic vacillations. One hopes that today's meeting (July 11) of Mercosur in Montevideo and the next meeting of Unasur could become propitious occasions for a re-orientation of Brazilian foreign policy.

(Translation: Jordan Bishop, for Alainet)

- Dr. Atilio Boron, director of the Latin American Programme of

distance Education in Social Sciences (PLED), Buenos Aires, Argentina. Libertador Prize in Critical Thinking, 2013.www.atilioboron.com.ar Twitter: > http://twitter.com/atilioboron

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(A shorter version of these comments was published in Página 12, Buenos Aires)

Notes:

(1) See the complete interview (in Spanish) in http://www.politicaexterna.com/17260/entrevista-de-antonio-patriota-para-a-veja#ixzz2YlP9rhdn

(2) On this theme see the important study of Telma Luzzani, Territorios Vigilados. Como opera la red de bases militares norteamericanas en Sudamérica (Buenos Aires: Debate, 2012). El tema también se examina en nuestro América Latina en la Geopolítica del Imperialismo (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Luxemburg, 2012)

https://www.alainet.org/en/active/65639?language=es