After so much struggle with new tactics in view of establishing a popular support base, so as to win in the parliamentary elections of December 2015, it seems the Venezuelan opposition, seeing the way blocked for them to obtain executive power through democratic and constitutional means, have returned to violence as the inertial mechanism of their political action.

Immersed in deep internal divisions and struggles for the control of parliament, the opposition fell into the trap of a power conflict with Chavism. Obsessed with the liberation of the "political prisoners", they wasted the opportunity of the most important political instrument at their disposition to continue to grow under the promise of "Change". Six months were enough to squander the political capital that they had in December 2015 and to turn them into an archipelago of fractions defending specific interests, that were absolutely useless for a sector of the population who really hoped they would serve as an effective tool to resolve the economic problems that afflict the country. Today, the weakness of the "pro-electoral" fractions and the divisionist character that defines the MUD (Mesa de la Unidad Democrática) frustrate any efforts for a national political dialogue, leaving the terrain open for the imposition of the most extreme sectors of the Venezuelan opposition under the hegemony of the Voluntad Popular party. The same creators of "la Salida" (the Way Out) in 2014 have displaced the creators of "El Cambio" in 2015, marking the present agenda.

Following the great mobilization that the MUD achieved in early September 2016, there was an important breakdown in the expectations of the opposition social base with respect to their leaders, given the erroneous offer that they made to their followers after the parliamentary electoral triumph. They had sold a fantasy: that after a great march in the east of the City of Caracas or a pronouncement by the National Assembly, Nicolas Maduro would automatically leave power. With generalized frustration among their support base, this breakdown brought the opposition down to low levels of mobilization in the streets, an abrupt loss of popularity of their leaders, and worse: an increase in the popularity of Nicolas Maduro that reached 30% in January 2017 after a difficult 2016. This level of political asphyxia forced them to adopt a strategy of short-term polarization. In a clear recognition of their incapacity to establish political routes at a national level, they returned to an easier way out: to seek the support of the imperial father (the USA) and heat up the streets with a combination of mobilizations of the political vanguard and clash groups that would allow them to construct a narrative of victimization of the opposition and the abuse of power (repression) on the part of the Government. The goal was to ignite the indignation and the spirit of a social support base that had given up on them.

Tactical change: qualifying the meanings of violence

The signs of the tactical change of the right began to appear after February 15 -- a few days after the US government sanctioned the Venezuelan vice-president for supposed ties to drug trafficking -- when Trump received Lilian Tintori. The US President then expressed his preoccupation for (her husband) Leopoldo López, whom he called a "political prisoner". During the previous week, other opposition figures visited the US: Freddy Guevara, Armando Armas and José Gregorio Correa [1]. It thus became evident that the new conservative offensive would count on rapid US “support” and that the leadership would shift to the radicals of Voluntad Popular.

1. Explicit international pressure 

This time, the United States took on a serious commitment to this task: from February 19 to March 20, the US made eleven public pronouncements and emitted four documents (communiqués, a report on human rights and resolutions) on the "worrying” Venezuelan situation, from high level spokespersons: President Trump, the Department of State with Rex Tillerson and Mark Toner, the Senate and the Ambassador in the OAS. At the same time they blatantly displayed their Lobby in the OAS with the solid support of the General Secretary, Luis Almagro, who most vehemently assumed his role as agitator and international operator of the conservative narrative and diplomacy on the Venezuelan political situation. Almagro, between February 28 and April 19, held four extraordinary sessions -- where fraudulent resolutions (without consent and openly violating internal norms) were emitted on Venezuela, bringing together a block of 11 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) whose foreign ministers lined up to attack the Venezuelan Government, making daily statements to the world press and on social networks.

Although the strategy began to emerge in mid-February with these first moves, its development has been evident in the streets of Venezuela for 24 days. What are they trying to get? To impose an environment of "ungovernability" that portrays the collapse of a republic, or rather, to crown a strategy of multinational siege against a sovereign country.

2.    “La Salida” reloaded

"La Salida" in 2014 lasted two months, left 43 dead and over 800 wounded. It was characterized by barricades, deadly traps for vehicles and pedestrians, the siege and burning of State installations and entrenchment in middle and high class urbanizations. It will go down in the history of the opposition and of the country as an ineffectual revolt of the rich to assault the political power in Venezuela through undemocratic means. Compared with 2014, "La Salida 2017", which is already a month old and counts 26 dead and over 300 wounded, is being developed in distinct objective and subjective conditions: in the midst of a difficult economic situation after the fall of oil prices, and in the framework of an open conflict among State powers that weakens the utility of public institutions and restricts political debate to parties, generating apathy and desperation among the majority. This version of "La Salida" is being played out in a particular socio-political arena and above all, appears to clearly indicate previous errors.

On this occasion, the sense of the protest was reoriented. They combined the recurrent conservative discourse on "dictatorship" and "lack of freedom of expression" with appeals relating to the critical economic situation of the popular classes and the delayed elections. Moreover, they elaborated a discourse to appeal to the international conservative block so that it would intervene in the Venezuelan situation: 1) "Dictatorship", appealing to a basic liberal argumentation on the lack of independence of powers (even when the Attorney General has taken a stand against the Supreme Council of Justice, and the Legislature operates on its own in the hands of the political opposition), they endlessly repeated terms such as "the rupture of constitutional order" with the intention of convincing, above all internationally, that the State is in collapse. 2)  Maximum international pressure": the president of the National Assembly, Julio Borges, had no sovereign considerations of any kind when he asked Donald Trump to intervene in Venezuela: "it is very important for us that President Trump be a factor helping to create maximum international pressure on the government of Nicolas Maduro (...) Venezuela is no longer a local problem of governability and authoritarianism, but a contagious disease that has roots and tentacles in all the problems of the region (...) the US could prohibit commercial or political interchange with Venezuela, imposing the Inter-American Democratic Charter of the OAS, which would involve the isolation of Venezuela: a country under quarantine” [2]. 3) Recuperate the "Pressure from the street", the line of argument of the mobilizations appealed to a Chavista reference to promote "people power".  Juan Guido, a Voluntad Popular deputy, was the spokesperson who usurped the meaning of this term: "When all other paths are closed, the original power, which is the power of the people, is expressed on the streets and in the exercise of protest. It is fundamental for everyone to go out to express themselves, and there are a thousand reasons, because what is fundamental is a space open to the participation of the people". Clearly, by combining references that Chavism installed in the political common sense and by provoking indignation with violence, they calculated that they could appeal to a soft Chavism, mobilizing their demoralized support base and thus return to the level of mobilization of September 2016.  Their numbers confirm this. ORC Consultores reports that, from April 1 to Tuesday, April 18, political protests made up 92% of demonstrations in the country.  While, in the first trimester of the year, these represented barely 20% [3].

3. Take root among the people: symbolically win Chavista territories

With the performance of violence and territorial deployment, they attempted to add symbolic value to the strategy. They sought to crown the sense of what they had lacked in 2014: symbolically occupy Chavista territories through violent actions of local destabilization, in order to cease to be seen as a class minority and establish themselves as a majority of the people. By the third week of "street pressure" they went from protests in the major arteries, streets and squares of the affluent areas of Caracas to convocations in popular districts where historically Chavism was hegemonic.

Territorializing the violence was the gamble of the third week of street pressure: 26 points at which to undertake protests in popular areas of Caracas was the line undertaken after the democratic victory of the country with the multitudinous Chavista marches and those of the opposition of last April 19. April 20th awoke to violent skirmishes in the East of Caracas (historic rightwing territory), barricades, tyre burnings, molotov cocktails hurled at the National Guard and photos. La Vega and El Valle (the area where Nicolas Maduro grew up) were the areas chosen: leaders of Primero Justicia and Voluntad Popular, under darkness, closed streets, promoted sackings and attacked the Maternity and Children’s Hospital "Hugo Chavez Frías" that had to be evacuated. Notably, in spite of arguing that these protests were spontaneous because the situation in the country "could not put up with any more", on the walls of buildings, sophisticated holograms were projected that said: "Maduro, the people are hungry" and "Maduro dictator". This long night included the participation of armed gangs of common delinquents that accompanied the "political demonstrations", leaving 10 people dead and a dozen wounded. This experiment in surgical violence to generate fear and symbolically debilitate Chavism corroborated the Government thesis: there is a relation between the leaders of these opposition parties and elements of organized delinquency in the country. It also confirmed that the "support" from the North not only involved media and diplomatic support, but that there was also a lot of money behind this tactical exchange.

In the following days, the protests returned to daylight hours on the main arteries. The "Silent March for the fallen" displayed the face of young students with blonde hair and fine features, and the destination was the Venezuelan Episcopal Conference. The discourses of the "street pressure” became "Elections Now" even though heavyweight leaders such as Carlos Radonsky and Luis Florido of Voluntad Popular said that they would not accept fraudulent elections and suggested that the OAS take on the organization of elections. Nevertheless, that same day a declaration of Henry Ramos Allup, president of the Acción Democrática party, created uncertainty with respect to a possible escalation of violence for the fourth week of April: "Today is a silent homage to all the fallen and the dead (...) including the potential victims and eventual ones that there will surely be in the coming days". The next day, April 24, the opposition called a "National Standstill" -- blocking vital arteries of the principal cities -- that in the early hours revealed a low level of participation of opposition demonstrators and in the afternoon erupted with violent actions in the States of Mérida and Barinas: people riding motorbikes fired on a Chavista demonstration and another opposition one, leaving three dead and six wounded. Once again, with reduced participation in the streets, violence reappears as an instrument of polarization.

In the face of these events, national public opinion has denounced the violence while social networks abound with ridicule of the protests that fail to fulfill the deceitful offer that the opposition continues to offer its base: to get Maduro out of power. In the streets, one begins to hear the exasperation with the daily unrest that slows down the country that is demanding solutions to the economic situation. 

Meanwhile, the Government of Nicolas Maduro, which continues to exercise institutional and military control, has once again called for political dialogue, indicated his willingness to call elections, and reiterated the discourse of national preoccupations (the problems of the economy and production) on which he appears to be the only political actor who is concerned with the financial complexities that the State is facing. On Sunday April 23 the President of the Republic announced that in the coming days he would promote a "historic popular solution" that will mark the rhythm of events to come. We shall see.

26/04/2017.-   

(Translated for ALAI by Jordan Bishop)

Camila Vollenweider

Lorena Freitez

Researchers with CELAG

Spanish original:

http://www.celag.org/venezuela-y-el-eterno-retorno-conservador-la-violencia/