Latin America is on the verge of a nervous breakdown. First Paraguay and Ecuador, then Argentina and now Venezuela. Presidents come and go within hours, demonstrating the instability of that institution on the continent and the gelatinous character of those societies resulting from the latest transformations promising stability and security. In the case of Venezuela, why did Hugo Chávez fall and come back to power? And what resources does he have to continue? Hugo Chávez was elected with 70 per cent of the popular votes, denouncing –and rightly so- the country’s elite and their petroleum fanfare: plundering the wealth of oil without industrialising the country and not liberating Venezuela from dependence on swinging international prices of the “black gold”. Chávez stood on this reality in an unorganised fashion, with cohesion in the military forces and on the increase of oil prices. One of his ministers –and current general coordinator of OPEC- Alí Rodríguez, became responsible for the re-institutionalisation of the quota policy which raised the price of petroleum. Respecting the cannons of liberal democracy, Chávez’s government implemented re-distributive social policies, reformed the Constitution and held and submitted himself to ongoing elections and plebiscites, These transformations, however, did not reach the centre points of power in Venezuelan society. The media maintained a solid front of opposition, converting itself into the centre of articulation for opposition to the government, while the only form of public expression for the government was limited to radio and television commentaries made by Chávez himself. He could not even penetrate the essential and strategic state petroleum corporation, whose engineers and trade unionists continued to be linked to the traditional unions which were aligned to the parties that were beaten by Chávez, more specifically Acción Democrática. Chávez designed a number of structural transformations, in a package of policies approved by the Parliament -The December Package. They began with a land reform but eventually extended into other areas including the petroleum and fishing sectors. At this point things started to change for Chávez, internally as well as externally. Conforming to the patterns of the US economy, which after expansion fell into a recession, prices started to descend. On the other hand, the domestic corporate boycott became more acute, as investors started to withhold capital and started closing down production sites. Chávez, in his militaristic way, began to alienate, opening various points of conflict all at once. As a result, he started to loose the support of party and popular groups that were initially with him. He directly confronted the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, which from the start were hostile towards him. With an economic downturn, the domestic situation only deteriorated. The opposition front As soon as his package of reforms was implemented, mobilisation against Chávez became more acute. The united corporate front, top corporate officials and the hierarchy of the Catholic Church led them primarily. The disenchanted middle classes who had strong links to Washington accompanied these. While Chávez started loosing his support from within his coalition –eventually counting on only half of the country’s parliamentarians- an opposition front composed of political dissidents started to congeal. Meanwhile, Chávez’s support base, especially the poorest sectors of Venezuelan society, remained unorganised and lacked the capacity to express themselves. It was the oil company strike that sparked a decisive conflict. Chávez could not permit the halt of production, as it would choke the country’s economy. The corporate officials, nevertheless, did not tolerate the direction that the President was taking because it would have meant the loss of control of the country’s main resources. Besides eroding Chávez’s power in the economic sphere, the opposition front was successful in gaining support from circles within the military. Remember that both the armed forces and the petroleum sectors, together with his personality, were the most essential elements for Chávez’s power legitimacy. While Chávez started to weaken, the opposition started to mobilise ‘pot and pan banging’ demonstrations consisting of 150-500 thousand people.

Coup and countercoup High officials in the country’s armed forces conducted the coup, after the deaths of a number of people during a demonstration that was squashed. Some were victims of the troops directly; others were hit by snipers, both indicating that the violence was instigated by opposition in the military. The government that followed the coup disrespected all institutional processes, openly revealing the corporate interests that were at hand: positioning a business leader as the president and the immediate establishment of a programme for the petroleum corporation, which included suspending sales to Cuba, the drifting away from OPEC policies, closer alignment to the US and the initiation of petroleum privatisation. Demonstrating the unorganised nature of Chávez’s support (civil society), it took a while before popular mobilisations against the coup took shape. But after they started, they were spread throughout the entire country until they finally reached the Presidential Palace. This occurred while those military leaders loyal to Chávez rebelled and the Parliament met and defended the right of the Vice- President to take control. The Organisation of American States unanimously condemned the coup and reaffirmed Chavez’s right to the Presidency. The business leader who became the de facto President was detained and Chávez returned with a combined discourse of rehabilitating his government and punishing those responsible for the coup, especially the press.

Perspectives How much energy does Chávez have left? That depends, in the first place, on his capacity to transform his project from one that was only for the popular masses, to another that is for the entire country. This has to be done while at the same time dismantling the axis of the coup, which already demonstrated its power to destroy him. Secondly, it depends on how much strength the opposition can muster, the time it will take for them to start taking on initiatives and on their capacity to go back to the offensive. This all depends, as well, on those sectors of society on which Chávez based himself, which will certainly decrease their activity decreased in relation to the heads of the armed forces, the parliament, and the petroleum company. It is most likely the case that his original project is burned, because he proposed a clear polarisation between the masses and the elite which embarked on confrontation. On the other hand, the traditional elite as well as Chávez noticed the solid reaction of the popular masses and the military. Rest assured that lessons would be extracted from them. Chávez already played a business gesture when he accepted the resigning of the petroleum corporation’s chiefs that he installed and were an object of opposition against his government. The next few weeks will tell if the wounds in Chávez’s three year-old programme will continue to bleed, or, if it is capable of healing. Externally, in region, the climate is now favourable; the price of petroleum is scheduled to rise. Meanwhile, the domestic plan will involve organising his popular base, dividing the opposition, sanctioning those directly linked to attempted coup, delivering the promises set out in his plans. All this in a way that will involve picking up consensus and not adversaries as time goes on.