The least unequal country in South America, Venezuela is a scene of strong political debate
21/08/2012
- Opinión
Breno Altman, Jonatas Campos, Marina Terra
Political dispute exists despite the reduction of income inequality and the maintenance of the consumption habits among the richest
One of the most accepted paradigms of political science, in the studies of electoral behavior, is that the reduction of the social abyss and the strengthening of the middle class tend to weaken political and ideological debate in society. Those who try to apply this logic in Venezuela, though, are confronted with disappointment. The dispute between Chavist and anti-Chavist groups is stirring up even though the country is becoming more homogeneous, reaching the top of the list of income distribution in South America.
“The politicization of every social class, more radical since the election of President Chávez, leads to an attitude that goes past the immediate interests of the distinct stratums”, analyses Jesse Chacon, director of GIS XXI (Group of Social Investigation Century XXI). “Here, left and right, government and opposition, they all go to the streets to fight over national projects that surpass punctual claims, economic benefits or social progresses.”
Chacón took part in the military rebellion of 1992, when the current president tried to overthrow the Fourth Republic. He was then a young lieutenant who ended up behind the bars with his boss. A system engineer with a masters in Telematics, he was the Minister of Communication and Minister of Science and Technology during the current government. At age 46, he studiest he social and political dynamics of Venezuela.
“The central point of tension is the fact that the owners of the means of production are rapidly losing their political power, and that causes a strong reaction among the highest social stratums and the ones around it”, he says. “The average income of the richest 20% was not affected, nor their lifestyle, buy they realize they are not in charge of the state and society anymore, and that makes them afraid and angry”.
In the poorest stratums, which are supported by the wide repertoire of social and distributive politics, the behavior is equally dictated by motivations that go beyond economic achievements or expectations. These stratums are on an upward move, partly because their life quality improved, but especially determined by the president’s effort to start arguments over ideas and values.
Since the beginning of his government, but even more after the coup d’état in 2002, Chávez has been trying to get as much media attention as he can. His speeches are almost always aimed at identifying every step of his government as part of a revolutionary process, as well as creating amongst his followers a feeling of repulse against those who oppose the changes.
By being against conciliation, the president made a pedagogical bet that was apparently successful: the more his country is polarized, the clearer the battle between points of view, and the easier it is for him to create constituency – for good and bad times.
At the beginning, the principal idea behind the Chavist pedagogy was the rescue of the beliefs of Simón Bolívar, patriarch of the Venezuelan independency, political and military chief of the war to free Spanish colonies in the 19th century. Walking this way, Chávez gave his project a strong sense of nationalism, placing his government against the new colonial masters (aka the Unites States) and its internal allies (the local elite).
Little by little, the original Bolivarianism was attached to the syntax of historical socialism. This mixture between historical nationalism and left-wing values became as widely disseminated as the cultural code that represents this government’s acts. Thus, the president is far from the trend recipe used even by his contemporary progressive politicians: they talk about politics in terms of efficiency. Chávez is a politician of the class conflicts that takes advantage of his position to isolate and defeat his enemies.
His opponents, who are in charge of most of the media, also put their cards on the table. Moreover, they have on their side strong economical strength and international relations that are enough to turn the middle class against the government. Even after the coup d’état and the lockout of 2002, at the peak of polarization, the anti-Chavist parties continued to fight against him.
The “C” class
But both sides have to face a new phenomenon. More than 30% of the population changed their social stratums. They went up from the poorest segments to what research sociology calls the “C” class – they’ve become middle class.
Thus, the government’s opponents are obligated to recognize some advance in the social field, instead of completely repelling the government strategies as they did before. Candidate Capriles campaign promises to preserve social missions, even though it has plans to remove the National Development Fund (Fonden), which uses oil money to finance social and housing programs. It also tempers the candidate’s message to be able to converse with the part of the society that benefits from the Fifth Republic.
The government’s supporters are also facing new questions. “The problem is disputing the hearts and minds of this new contingent of middle class”, says Chacón. “A lot of people who ascended socially thanks to government’s initiatives have embraced the moral and cultural values of the elite, whose lifestyle they use as reference.” The former military is especially talking about the maintenance of consumption desires, the indifference towards collective projects and organizations and the refusal to identify oneself with one’s original class, or, sometimes, even with one’s race.
Distinct research, done both by GIS XXI and institutes that are closely tied to the government’s opponents, say that in the last few years, a new group of electors has emerged, informally referred to as the “ni-ni” (freely translated from Spanish it, means “the nor-nor”). That is, they are neither automatically allied with Chávez nor with his enemies. Most of them are part of these new ascending classes.
The ni-ni represents around 40% of the electors, against an equal number of Chavists, and a 20% of faithful opponents. The left, nevertheless, has had results above their margins, thanks to a combination of popular satisfaction with government programs (especially with the housing mission) and the affective climate of solidarity provoked by Chávez’ cancer. In the most reliable researches, the president has the support of almost 60% of those who intend to vote in October’s election, opening a window of 15% to 30% against Capriles.
These numbers indicate that the ni-ni are divided between the two poles. Despite the tendency to be in favor of the president’s reelection, even outnumbering those who are not, the search for support in this part of the electorate continues frenetic. “If Chávez’ campaign can reach a major part of this middle class, an even more meaningful advantage can be reached.”
Strategies
One of the strategies to fight the resistance among this hybrid portion of the population, so it seems, is to change the idea, widely spread the media connected to the opposition, that Chávez is going to end private property and put all economic activity on the hands of the State.
“This government increased the number of land owners in the country, especially after the land reform began”, says the director of GIS XXI. “The program of the revolution is against monopoly and strengthens the State, but opens up space for several kinds of property, whether private, cooperative or social. The government needs to better define the role of each of these modalities to bury the image of a fundamentalist state that its opponents try to sell.”
The opponent candidate, on the other hand, has the contrary problem. Representing an alliance formed by major industries (like brewery Polar, the agro industrial group Mavesa and the food company Alfonzo Rivas, among others), Capriles needs to convince voters that he is able to absorb at least part of the social measures that, since 1999, were good for 80% of the population who are not part of the higher classes.
His government program is not very helpful in that pursuit. Even though it is softer when it comes to criticizing this government’s social politics, the will to privatize is there, and it’s strong. It not only promises to reduce the power of State, revert the nationalizations and take PDVSA out of State control, but it also explicitly defends that the land that was dispossessed from the great agricultural state owners will be restored to them. “First, we need to end expropriations, bring security to the countryside, and provide trust that comes from the government”, said Capriles in a recent press conference.
Whatever the result is, nevertheless, Hugo Chávez’ administration will have managed to do deeds that deserve to be analyzed by political scientists. Contrary to what happens in most countries, in which marketing takes over politics and hides the dispute of ideas to attend the voter taste, in Venezuela the electoral needs hide the frontal battle of the candidate’s programs.
(Translation: Kelly Cristina Spinelli)
https://www.alainet.org/en/articulo/160507
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